Cyclical implications of the Basel II capital standards by Anil Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein
18 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Anil K Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein
Anil K Kashyap is the Edward Eagle Brown Professor
of Economics and Finance in the Graduate School of
Business at the University of Chicago and a consultant to
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Jeremy C. Stein is a
professor of economics in the Department of Economics at
Harvard University. Both authors are research associates
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. The
authors are grateful to Peter Garber and Sebastian Fritz
for many helpful conversations about this project and to
Michael Luxenburger for carrying out the computations
shown in tables 1 and 2. This article is an abridged
version of a working paper with the same title (Kashyap
and Stein, 2003). The original research for this article
was done as part of a consulting project by the authors for
Deutsche Bank. The authors also thank Jon Frey, Craig
Furfine, Michael Gordy, Eric Rosengren, Vicky Saporta,
and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Board
and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for helpful
comments and suggestions.
Cyclical implications of the Basel II capital standards
Introduction and summary
One of the central changes proposed as part of the new
Basel II regulatory framework is the concept of inter-
nal-rating-based (IRB) capital requirements.1 Under the
IRB approach, the amount of capital that a bank will
have to hold against a given exposure will be a function
of the estimated credit risk of that exposure. Estimated
credit risk in turn is taken to be a predetermined function
of four parameters: probability of default (PD), loss
given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and
maturity (M). Banks operating under the “Advanced”
variant of the IRB approach will be responsible for
providing all four of these parameters themselves, based
on their own internal models. Banks operating under
the “Foundation” variant of the IRB approach will be
responsible only for providing the PD parameter, with
the other three parameters to be set externally by the
Basel committee.2
It is clear that there are many potential benefits to
further refining the existing risk-based capital require-
ments. As compared with the “one-size-fits-all” approach
embodied in the original Basel I framework, IRB capi-
tal requirements should reduce pricing distortions across
loan categories, as well as the accompanying incen-
tives for banks to engage in various forms of regulatory
capital arbitrage. At the same time, this new approach
to capital regulation raises some concerns. One con-
cern that has been voiced repeatedly—but has been
subject to relatively little formal analysis—is that the
new capital standards will exacerbate business cycle
fluctuations. In brief, the idea is that in a downturn,
when a bank’s capital base is likely being eroded by
loan losses, its existing (non-defaulted) borrowers will
be downgraded by the relevant credit-risk models, forc-
ing the bank to hold more capital against its current loan
portfolio. To the extent that it is difficult or costly for
the bank to raise fresh external capital in bad times,
it will be forced to cut back on its lending activity,
thereby contributing to a worsening of the initial
downturn.
Our aim in this article is to take a closer look at this
“cyclicality” aspect of the Basel II capital regulations.
There are two primary components to our analysis.
First, we start by developing a conceptual framework,
which can be used to ask questions about the optimali-
ty of the proposed regulations. Our main conclusion
here is that the Basel II approach of having a single
time-invariant “risk curve”—that maps credit-risk mea-
sures (such as the PD) into capital charges—is, in gen-
eral, suboptimal. From the perspective of a social planner
who cares not just about bank defaults per se, but also
about the efficiency of bank lending, it is more desir-
able to have a family of risk curves, with the capital
charge for any given degree of credit-risk exposure
being reduced when economy-wide bank capital is
scarce relative to lending opportunities (as in, for
example, a recession).319 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Of course, this is only a theoretical argument, and
it leaves unanswered one key empirical question: How
big might the costs associated with the imperfect Basel
II approach plausibly be? Although this question is
hard to answer fully, we attempt to make some progress
on it in the second part of our analysis. We do so by
simulating the degree of capital-charge cyclicality that
would have taken place over the four-year interval
1998–2002 had the Basel II regulations been in force
during this period.
Although several other recent papers have under-
taken similar exercises, we make an effort to be rela-
tively comprehensive, along several dimensions.4 First,
recognizing that banks may use different types of credit-
risk models to arrive at parameters such as the PD, we
do all of our simulations with two distinct categories
of models: 1) a model based on Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) credit ratings; and 2) a model developed by
the consulting firm KMV, which is based on a Merton
(1974) option-pricing approach to estimating default
probabilities.
Second, in light of the fact that different banks have
very different loan portfolios, we check to see how
our conclusions vary by region (for example, North
America versus Europe) and by borrower risk type
(for example, investment-grade versus non-investment-
grade). Finally, across all of these simulations, we try
to pay careful attention to a host of subtle method-
ological issues. The results can be quite sensitive to
survivorship bias, as well as to how one treats firms
that disappear from the datasets. We provide a detailed
account of these issues and do our best to address them
in a sensible and consistent fashion.
We should emphasize that our goal with these sim-
ulations is not so much to make a definitive case for a
single “best” estimate of the degree of cyclicality in
capital charges. Rather, we want to establish a plausi-
ble range of values and to explore in some detail how
capital-charge cyclicality can vary both with the meth-
odology used by the bank in question and with the com-
position of the bank’s portfolio. In some cases, our
estimates imply a relatively large degree of cyclical
variation. For example, applying the KMV model to
samples of investment-grade borrowers yields increases
in capital charges in the range of 70 percent to 90 per-
cent over the period 1998–2002. In other cases, the mag-
nitudes are more moderate, although they still appear
to be economically significant. For example, the S&P-
based simulations show capital-charge increases on the
order of 30 percent to 45 percent over the same period.
Of course, even if one concludes that the single
risk curve will exacerbate cyclical fluctuations, there
is then the important question of what might be done
instead. We realize that there are a host of difficult im-
plementation issues that would be involved in allow-
ing the risk curve to vary. We discuss these issues in
our concluding comments.
In the next section, we develop our conceptual
framework. Then, we describe the results of the sim-
ulations. In the following section, we briefly survey
the related literature in this area, making a particular
effort to reconcile our empirical results with those re-
ported in other work. Finally, we offer some sugges-
tions for further study.
Conceptual framework
What are the goals of capital regulation?
In order to come to a view about the desirability
of the proposed features of the Basel II accord, one
first needs to have a clear understanding of the under-
lying economic goals of bank capital regulation. As
with any form of regulation, the case for regulating bank
capital presumably rests on some sort of market fail-
ure, or externality. In this particular case, the externali-
ty is that bank failures have systemic costs that are
not fully borne by the bank in question. These system-
ic costs include losses absorbed by government de-
posit insurance, disruptions to other players in the financial
system, and so forth. Thus, the regulator’s task is to
somehow get the bank to internalize these systemic
costs. In principle, there are a number of different ways
to do so, and capital regulation can be thought of as
one such method.
Of course, when one says that a goal of regulation
is to get banks to internalize systemic costs associated
with default, this is not the same as saying that these
default costs are the only thing that a well-intentioned
social planner should care about. Rather, the social
planner should also continue to put weight on those
objectives of banks that were properly internalized in
the first place, for example, making positive net present
value (NPV) loans; this is the sense in which we earli-
er described the planner as caring about the “efficien-
cy” of bank lending. This implies a tradeoff. On the
one hand, one can always reduce expected default costs
by raising the capital requirement. On the other hand,
if it is expensive for banks to raise and/or hold addi-
tional capital, a too-stringent capital requirement will
lead to a reduction in bank lending, with the associated
underinvestment on the part of those borrowers who
are dependent on bank credit. The proper goal of reg-
ulation, therefore, is to balance two competing objec-
tives: 1) protecting the system against costs of bank
defaults versus 2) encouraging the creation of positive-
NPV loans.20 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
At one level, the existence of this tradeoff is ob-
vious and well understood—the fact that capital charges
are not 100 percent for all loans is testament to the fact
that regulators care about something other than simply
driving the probability of bank default to zero. At the
same time, there is another implication of the tradeoff
that generally receives less attention: When banks’ lend-
ing activities are more severely capital constrained
(that is, when underinvestment problems are worse),
it is socially desirable to accept a higher probability
of bank default, all else equal. In other words, when
times are worse, there needs to be some adjustment
on both the default-cost and lending margins. It can-
not make sense for bank lending to bear the entire brunt
of the adjustment, while the expected costs of bank
defaults remain constant.
In contrast to this tradeoff type of logic, most dis-
cussions of bank capital regulation start from the premise
that the goal is to hold the probability of bank default
below some fixed target level. For example, it is com-
mon to speak in terms of, say, a 99.90 percent confi-
dence level, which means that the bank has enough
capital such that there is only a 0.10 percent probabili-
ty of default over the next year. Once this target con-
fidence level is set, one can use information on the
nature of the bank’s portfolio—along with various
other assumptions—to figure out how much capital it
will take to achieve the target. Gordy (2003) is a well-
known paper in this vein. Indeed, Gordy is able to show
that, under certain special circumstances, an approach
to risk-based capital charges very much like that set
out in the Basel II accord is the most efficient way to
achieve the target confidence level. This Basel II ap-
proach can be summarized in terms of a single “risk
curve,” which relates the capital charge for any given
loan to the risk attributes of that loan, such as its prob-
ability of default (PD).
The problem with targeting a single once-and-for-
all confidence level is that this essentially amounts to
treating default costs as the only legitimate item in the
social planner’s objective function and completely
ignoring the importance of the bank lending function.
This has the potential to lead to capital requirements
that inefficiently exacerbate cyclical fluctuations in
lending, as we describe next.
Potential cyclicality problems with a fixed risk curve
Consider the effects of a recession under a regime
of capital regulation that targets a fixed confidence level.
The recession will have two effects. First, it will nat-
urally lead to loan losses, thereby eroding banks’ capi-
tal positions. Second, existing non-defaulted loans
are likely to become significantly riskier—that is, to
have higher PDs. Thus, if there is a single fixed risk
curve, as is contemplated under Basel II, the capital
charges for banks’ existing portfolios will go up. This
will further tighten the overall capital constraint, put-
ting additional downward pressure on lending activity.
This is not to say that any cuts in bank lending
during a recession are undesirable. To the contrary—
it is to be expected that there are to be fewer positive-
NPV lending opportunities in bad times, so it is efficient
for there to be some scaling back of bank loan port-
folios.5 In terms of economic efficiency, the key item
of interest is the shadow value of bank capital, which
measures the scarcity of bank capital relative to posi-
tive-NPV lending opportunities. A higher shadow
value of bank capital indicates a greater relative scar-
city and, hence, more severe problems of underinvest-
ment in terms of lending and, ultimately, in terms of
physical investment. If a capital-regulation regime targets
a fixed confidence level and at the same time leads to
a shadow value of bank capital that rises markedly in re-
cessions (that is, it leads to lending that is excessively
procyclical), this would be suboptimal from the per-
spective of the tradeoff that we have described above.
It is not a priori obvious that the shadow value of
bank capital must necessarily go up in bad times. There
are two competing effects: On the one hand, loan losses
and reduced operating income tend to lower the stock
of bank capital, which pushes its shadow value up. On
the other hand, a slowdown in aggregate economic ac-
tivity means that there are fewer positive-NPV lend-
ing opportunities, which works in the opposite direction.
Determining which of the two effects dominates
has been the subject of a number of empirical investiga-
tions.6 Peek and Rosengren (1995), in one of the most
informative of these studies, examine the lending be-
havior of banks in New England during the 1990–91
recession. The point of focusing on this period is to iso-
late banks that faced a large common shock. They show
that the banks that suffered the largest declines in capi-
tal cut lending the most—as would be predicted if
capital constraints were binding. Most of the paper is
devoted to showing that this finding is not plausibly
interpreted as the result of the capital-impaired banks
having bigger reductions in the demand for loans.
A recent paper by van den Heuvel (2002) argues
that the Peek and Rosengren results apply more broadly
to generic downturns that are induced by a tightening
of monetary policy. He reports regressions showing
that states in which the banking system is less well capi-
talized prior to a monetary tightening show larger subse-
quent output declines. This finding would be predicted
if bank capital was scarce and bank borrowers could
not offset declines in bank loans from other sources.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Thus, we read the literature on bank capital
crunches as generally supporting the notion that bank
capital is scarcer (that is, has a higher shadow value)
during recessions.
What do socially optimal capital requirements
look like?
In the longer working paper version of this article
(Kashyap and Stein, 2003), we present a model of the
regulator’s problem that starts from first principles.
Instead of just assuming that the goal of capital regu-
lation is to target a fixed confidence level, we postu-
late that the regulator has an objective function that
explicitly incorporates two considerations: 1) like the
banks themselves, the regulator cares about the creation
of positive-NPV loans (that is, loans on which the re-
turn exceeds the appropriate discount rate), but 2) the
regulator also puts weight on the additional social costs
of bank defaults. Using this model, we ask how the
regulator can best maximize the objective function
using capital regulation.
In the interests of brevity, and because the results
are quite intuitive, we simply summarize the predictions
from the model. The main finding is that instead of
there being a single once-and-for-all risk curve that
maps risk measures (such as the PD) into capital charges,
optimality requires a family of point-in-time risk curves,
with each curve corresponding to a different shadow
value of bank capital—that is, to different macroeco-
nomic conditions. In other words, one would target a
high confidence level (for example, 99.90 percent) in
good times, when bank capital is relatively plentiful
and hence has a low shadow value. When there is a
recession, and the shadow value of bank capital goes
up, one would shift to a lower curve, corresponding
to a reduced confidence level (for example, 99.50 per-
cent) and reduced capital charges. Figure 1 provides
an illustration of this approach.
There are two equivalent ways to accomplish the
curve-shifting envisioned in figure 1. First, and most
intuitively, the required ratio of capital to risk-weighted
assets can adjust to offset movements in the shadow
value of bank capital. Thus, for example, the capital
requirement might be lowered from 8 percent to 6 per-
cent in a recession. Alternatively, if the required ratio
of capital to risk-weighted assets is to be kept fixed
at some constant value (say 8 percent), then an increase
in the shadow value of bank capital (for example, a
recession) needs to be accompanied by a downward
shift in the set of risk weights assigned to loans of
varying degrees of riskiness.
The approach that we are outlining makes a sharp
distinction between 1) the cross-sectional sensitivity
of capital charges to risk at a point in time; and 2) the
time-series sensitivity of capital charges to risk over
the business cycle. Consider first the cross-sectional
question. For a fixed point in time, suppose we com-
pare the optimal capital charges for two different types
of loans. This corresponds to moving along a single
curve in figure 1, say from point 1 to point 2. Thus,
the relative capital charges for the two types of loans
should depend only on their relative riskiness. Or, said
differently, capital charges should be fully sensitive
to risk in the cross-section.
Now consider the business cycle question. Suppose
we have a fixed loan type, whose risk increases as we
move from an expansionary environment to a recession
(think of a borrower who has been downgraded). This
corresponds to a movement across the two risk curves
in figure 1, say from point 1 to point 3. In this case,
the capital charge does not rise as sharply for a given
increase in risk as it does in the cross-sectional case.
Limitations of the Basel II framework
This analysis highlights the problems inherent in
the current Basel II framework, which envisions a single
once-and-for-all risk curve, rather than a family of
risk curves. Basel II would force the cross-sectional
slope of the curve—for example, the ratio of capital
charges for an AA credit and a BBB credit at a fixed
point in time—to be the same as the time-series slope—
for example, the ratio of capital charges for an AA credit
that gets downgraded to BBB during a recession. As
we have framed it, this amounts to trying to solve two
problems with a single instrument.
Of course, one can always do better on the time-
series problem, say by flattening the curve, as is illustrat-
ed in figure 2. And indeed, recent revisions to the Basel
II formulas have moved in the direction of such flat-
tening.7 But with a single curve, this necessarily
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comes at the expense of doing worse on the cross-sec-
tional problem: a too-flat curve distorts banks’ pricing
of risk at a given point in time and is likely to be at
odds with the methods that banks (appropriately) use
for their internal decision-making.
Will banks offset cyclicality by holding
excess capital?
One argument that is sometimes made is that banks
will naturally tend to offset any potential cyclicality
problems by holding buffer stocks of excess capital
during good times. While this argument contains a
kernel of truth, it is fundamentally unsound. A rational
farsighted bank may indeed engage in some buffer-
stocking. But essentially, the buffer stock will be set
today so that if things turn out as expected at some
future date, the bank will be no more capital-constrained
then than it is today. Of course, the problem is that a
recession is, almost by definition, an outcome that is
worse than anticipated.8 So the realized shadow value
of capital is still likely to go up significantly in a re-
cession (that is, there is still likely to be something of
a credit crunch), in which case our previous analysis
continues to apply. By way of analogy, this is exactly
like saying that even if an individual holds an optimal
level of precautionary savings, he will nevertheless
see his consumption fall if he is hit with a sufficient-
ly adverse unexpected shock—for example, a serious
illness or long-term layoff.
There is a simple reason why a family of risk curves
is still preferred to a single once-and-for-all risk curve,
even when banks are farsighted and hold optimal buff-
er stocks. When a bank chooses how much capital to
hold at some initial point in time, it cannot know ex-
actly what the shadow value of bank capital will be
in the future. In contrast, with a family of risk curves,
the regulator effectively gets to pick the right curve
after the fact, once this shadow value is known.
Simulating the cyclicality of risk-based
capital requirements
Overview
We now turn to our empirical analysis.9 As noted
in the introduction, our aim here is to simulate the ef-
fects that the Basel II framework could potentially have
on the cyclicality of bank capital requirements. To do
so, we study the period from December 1998 to December
2002, an interval that was marked by pronounced
economic slowdowns in both the U.S. and Europe.
We also consider two different types of models that
banks might conceivably use to estimate PDs under
the new rules: 1) a model based on S&P counterparty
ratings; and 2) a model developed by KMV that imple-
ments a Merton (1974) approach to estimating default
probabilities. In each case, once we have the model-
based PD for a given borrower, we apply “typical”
values for the other three parameters (LGD, EAD,
and M), and crank all four of these numbers through
the Basel Committee’s formula to arrive at the required
capital charge for that borrower.10 In other words, ir-
respective of the model, we always apply the same map-
ping to get from a borrower’s PD to its capital charge.
Wherever possible, we also disaggregate our uni-
verse of borrowers along two dimensions: 1) regional
(for example, North America versus Europe); and 2)
credit quality (that is, investment-grade versus non-
investment-grade). We do so to get an idea of how
the degree of cyclicality might plausibly vary across
banks with different loan portfolios. We will not take
a stand on which particular subsample is most informa-
tive, since we expect different banks to have different
customer mixes.
Likewise, we view the larger KMV sample and
smaller S&P sample as two proxies for the experience
of a diversified sample of bank customers. Ideally, one
would like to know what happens to the typical small
firm that is not publicly traded or rated as well. Un-
fortunately, tracking small firms over time is challenging,
as they are more likely to fail and to have transitory
relationships with banks, so finding consistent data
on them is difficult. The longer working paper version
of this article shows some calculations with a sample
of Deutsche Bank borrowers, and for the borrowers
that could be tracked the results were qualitatively
similar to those for the KMV sample.
Before getting to the estimates, we need to con-
front a host of tricky measurement questions.
Methodological issues
In all of our simulations, the basic goal is to ask
how the capital requirements for a fixed loan portfo-
lio might evolve over the course of a business cycle
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downturn. This is to be contrasted with the question
of how an actively managed portfolio might behave.
In the latter case, active management muddles togeth-
er the direct effect of a tightened capital constraint with
the bank’s endogenous response. For example, suppose
we look at the evolution of a bank’s actively managed
portfolio during a recession and find that average credit
quality (and hence the mean capital charge) is rough-
ly unchanged. Should we conclude from this that there
is no cyclicality problem deserving of policymaker
attention? Probably not—it may just be that the bank
has reacted to a tightening capital constraint by cut-
ting off credit to its riskier borrowers, which is pre-
cisely the policy problem that concerns us.
Although the fixed-loan-portfolio question sounds
straightforward, answering it with available data re-
quires us to confront several methodological problems.
Survivorship bias
One problem that arises across all variants of our
simulations is survivorship bias. This problem can be
illustrated by reference to our S&P sample, which we
describe in more detail shortly. The total number of
non-defaulted firms that are present in this dataset as
of December 1998 is 3,599. However, even holding
aside firms that eventually default, another 542 of
these original firms—about 15 percent—simply dis-
appear from the sample by December 2002. These
disappearances could reflect mergers, delistings, or
unrecorded defaults.
If one draws the sample for our simulations by
imposing the criterion that we must have data on a
firm for all four years 1998–2002 in order for it to be
included, this will create a potentially severe survivor-
ship bias. In the S&P case, this would mean exclud-
ing the 542 firms that disappeared from the dataset,
and one suspects that these firms probably had worse-
than-average performance over the period even if they
did not default. Thus, excluding them would lead us
to understate the degree of cyclicality in capital charges.
Therefore, in all of our simulations we begin with
a sample that includes every non-defaulted firm present
in a given dataset in 1998. This is in principle the right
way to address the survivorship-bias issue. Of course,
it raises another question, which is how we fill in the
missing values for those firms that disappear later on.
Filling in missing values for firms that disappear
from the sample
Suppose that a given firm is in the S&P dataset
in 1998, with a rating of A–, and that it reappears in
1999, with a rating of BB+. After that, it disappears,
so we have no further information on it for 2000, 2001,
or 2002. How should we handle this observation?
In the full version of the paper we experiment
with two different approaches. The first, which we
call “freezing,” sets the rating (or, equivalently, the PD)
in all the missing years to the last observed value. Thus
in this example, the firm would be assigned a rating
of BB+ for each year in the 2000–2002 interval. This
method is simple enough, but almost certainly biased
toward generating too little cyclicality in our particu-
lar sample period. We know that on average firms were
being downgraded over this period, so freezing the
missing observations at stale ratings levels prevents
us from capturing this tendency.
An alternative approach, which we call “imputa-
tion,” works as follows. If firm i is last observed in
year t, we take all firms in the same geographic region
and the same rating class as firm i that survive until
t + 1. We then impute to firm i in years t + 1 the aver-
age rating (and hence average PD) of these surviving
peers. In our previous example, the firm that disappears
as a BB+ in 1999 would be attributed a rating in 2000
equal to the average year 2000 rating of all firms in
its region that were also BB+ in 1999. We then follow
an analogous procedure for years t + 2, etc.
This imputation approach still has its rough edges,
but it gets around the basic problem of assuming that
disappearing firms never would have experienced
further downgrades had they remained in the sample.
In the interests of brevity, we only report the results
based on the imputation procedure, but in the longer
version of the article we compare the two procedures
and show that imputation generally leads to estimates
of cyclicality that are greater than those that come out
of the freezing method.
Handling firms that default
A distinct question has to do with how we handle
a firm that remains in the dataset, but is known to be
in default. Here again, we experiment with two differ-
ent approaches. In the first, we keep defaulted firms
in the simulations in all years. Thus, if a firm defaults
in 1999, we keep it in as a defaulted firm (with a PD
set to 1) in all subsequent years. With this approach,
we always have exactly the same number of observa-
tions in our simulations in each year—that is, simply
the number of firms that were not in default and were
present in the data in 1998, 3,599 in the S&P dataset.
Alternatively, we discard defaulted firms in the
year after they default. So if a firm defaults in 1999,
we keep it in for 1999, but throw it out thereafter. In
our S&P dataset, this leads us to reduce the number
of observations by 304, to 3,295, as of 2002.
Unlike the freezing versus imputation question, here
it is not obvious to us that one method is inherently24 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
more attractive than another. Rather, we see them as an-
swering two somewhat different questions. When we
keep all the defaults in the sample, this tells us some-
thing about the total capital shortfall that a bank
would have faced as a result of deteriorating economic
conditions over the period 1998–2002, due to both
loan losses and increased capital charges on remain-
ing non-defaulted loans. Of course, some of this short-
fall would have occurred even under the Basel I rules,
as the bank would have had to eventually recognize
losses on defaulted loans in either case. When we re-
move defaulted firms from the sample, this is essen-
tially like asking how much additional (as compared
to Basel I) cyclicality Basel II creates as a result of
the variation in capital charges that it imposes on firms
that are downgraded, but that remain out of default.
An example may help to illustrate this distinc-
tion. Consider a bank with 100 in loans as of 1998,
each with a capital charge of 8 percent. The bank is
thus required to hold 8 in capital; assume that it just
meets this constraint with equality in 1998. By 2002,
ten of the original loans have defaulted, with losses
given default of 45 percent (that is, the recovery rate
is 55 percent). The remaining 90 in loans that are still
on the books have been downgraded, and each now
has a Basel II capital charge of 10 percent. Of course,
under Basel I, the capital charge on these remaining
loans would stay at 8 percent.
If no further capital is raised, the bank’s total stock
of capital in 2002 is 3.5—the original 8, less 4.5 in
loan losses from defaults. Under Basel II, the capital
charge for the remaining loans in 2002 is 9 (9 = 90 ×
10 percent). So the bank has a total shortfall relative
to its capital requirement of 5.5 (5.5 = 9 – 3.5). Un-
der Basel I, the capital charge in 2002 is 7.2 (7.2 =
90 × 8 percent), and the bank has a total shortfall of
3.7 (3.7 = 7.2 – 3.5). The extra shortfall created as a
result of switching from Basel I to Basel II is thus 1.8.
If we do not remove defaulted firms from our
sample, our methodology will generate a total “capi-
tal charge” for 2002 of 13.5 under Basel II (13.5 =
90 × 10 percent + 10 × 45 percent). So we would say
that there has been an increase of 5.5 from the initial
1998 level of 8. That is, this approach captures the
entire capital shortfall of 5.5 that arises under Basel
II, due to both downgrades (1.8 of the shortfall) and
defaults (3.7 of the shortfall). In contrast, if we do re-
move defaulted firms, we only look at the non-de-
faulted 90 of loans in both 1998 and 2002. For these
loans, the capital requirement goes up by 1.8, from
7.2 to 9.0. Note that this figure of 1.8 corresponds ex-
actly to the increase in the shortfall that arises as a
result of the move from Basel I to Basel II.
To summarize, we experiment with two different
methodologies:
Method 1: Keep all firms (including defaults) in the
sample at all times, and use the imputa-
tion technique to deal with any missing
firms.
Method 2: Remove firms in the year after they de-
fault, and use the imputation technique
to deal with any missing firms.
Whether method 1 or 2 is preferred depends on
the question at hand: that is, total cyclicality versus
extra cyclicality created by Basel II.11 The method 2
numbers are by their nature less dramatic, so if one is
looking for a conservative set of estimates, these are
probably the ones to look at first.
Results from S&P counterparty ratings
As noted above, our S&P universe starts with
3,599 non-defaulted firms for which we have ratings
information as of December 1998. We convert each
firm’s rating into a PD, using a fixed correspondence
across all regions and time periods.12 The PDs in turn
can be mapped into capital charges, using the Basel
Committee’s formula. We then compute mean capital
charges in each year, dealing with defaulted and miss-
ing firms according to the protocols spelled out in
methods 1 and 2.
In table 1, we show the percent change in capital
charges over the 1998–2002 period, both for the full
sample and for a variety of subsamples. (When we split
the sample into investment-grade and non-investment-
grade subsamples, we do so once and for all based on
a firm’s rating as of 1998.) If one looks at the results
corresponding to our preferred method 2, they tell a
reasonably consistent story across Europe and North
America, as well as across investment-grade and non-
investment-grade firms: Increases in capital charges
are generally in the range of 30 percent to 45 percent
over the period 1998–2002. The “rest of world” sub-
sample yields considerably higher increases, in the
80 percent range, but one should probably not make
too much of this particular finding, as the sample
size here is very small—only 320 borrowers in total.
Not surprisingly, method 1, which keeps default-
ed firms in the sample, generates substantially higher
estimates, with numbers in many cases approaching
100 percent. Again, however, these numbers are best
thought of not as a measure of the incremental degree
of cyclicality associated with the transition from Basel
I to Basel II, but rather as a measure of the total capi-
tal shortfall that banks experience in a recession, due
to a combination of downgrades and loan losses.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Although the method 2 estimates are not huge,
they still would appear to be economically signifi-
cant. One useful benchmark is that the method 2 esti-
mates are in most cases at least 40 percent of the
corresponding method 1 numbers, and sometimes
(typically with investment-grade borrowers) quite a
bit more. This suggests that the added cyclical pres-
sure on bank capital positions associated with Basel
II is of almost the same order of magnitude as the
preexisting baseline effect under Basel I.13 In other
words, to the extent that there have previously been
concerns expressed about capital crunches during re-
cessions, the change from Basel I to Basel II might
be expected to—very loosely speaking—almost dou-
ble the impetus behind these episodes.
The method 2 estimates are also noteworthy in
the context of rating agencies’ stated goal of rating
borrowers “through the cycle.” Under this approach,
a borrower’s rating is supposed to be based not on its
current likelihood of default per se, but instead on its
probability of default in a fixed hypothetical downside
scenario. This is clearly intended to smooth out ratings
over the course of a business cycle. But as we can
see in the table, this smoothing is far from total—there
remains a good deal of cyclicality.
Results from KMV model
Table 2 presents our results from the KMV model
simulations. Before comparing these results to those
in table 1, it is important to note that the samples are
quite different.14 Our KMV sample starts with a much
larger universe of firms (17,253 versus 3,599) and a
larger fraction of these firms are non-investment-grade
than in the S&P data (58 percent versus 38 percent).
One way this shows up is in the mean initial capital
charge in 1998: It is 10.72 percent for the entire KMV
sample, versus 5.85 percent for the S&P sample.
These differences imply that it may not be too
meaningful to directly compare the cyclicality estimates
for the two full samples; these comparisons will be
confounded by the fact that we are not holding the com-
position of firms constant. It probably makes a bit more
sense to compare the investment-grade subsamples,
TABLE 1
Capital-charge cyclicality, 1998–2002, using S&P ratings
Percent change
Initial capital, capital
Method Region Rating class 1998 1998–2002
1 All All 5.85 86.36
1 All Investment-grade 2.40 59.28
1 All Non-investment-grade 11.59 95.66
1 Europe All 3.05 66.21
1 Europe Investment-grade 1.84 41.49
1 Europe Non-investment-grade 12.19 94.65
1 North America All 6.28 84.36
1 North America Investment-grade 2.52 56.92
1 North America Non-investment-grade 11.56 92.73
1 Rest of world All 6.07 118.99
1 Rest of world Investment-grade 2.55 105.10
1 Rest of world Non-investment-grade 11.70 123.84
2 All All 5.85 31.45
2 All Investment-grade 2.40 43.67
2 All Non-investment-grade 11.59 42.90
2 Europe All 3.05 33.40
2 Europe Investment-grade 1.84 41.49
2 Europe Non-investment-grade 12.19 47.86
2 North America All 6.28 26.81
2 North America Investment-grade 2.52 37.64
2 North America Non-investment-grade 11.56 37.66
2 Rest of world All 6.07 77.89
2 Rest of world Investment-grade 2.55 97.04
2 Rest of world Non-investment-grade 11.70 87.92
Notes: Investment-grade (IG) refers to all firms with a rating of BBB– or better in December 1998; non-investment-grade (non-IG) refers to
those with a rating of BB+ or worse. There are 3,599 observations in the full sample (2,247 IG and 1,352 non-IG); 456 in the Europe
subsample (403 IG and 53 non-IG); 2,823 in the North America subsample (1,647 IG and 1,176 non-IG); and 320 in the rest-of-world
subsample (197 IG and 123 non-IG).26 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
where the compositional differences are likely to be
less of an issue.
When we do so, it appears that the KMV method-
ology leads to substantially more cyclicality in capital
charges. For example, using method 2 and focusing
on all investment-grade borrowers, the mean S&P-based
change in capital from 1998 to 2002 is 44 percent,
while the corresponding KMV number is 83 percent.
This is consistent with previous research, which has
come to the same basic conclusion. And it also fits with
the idea that the KMV approach is meant to deliver a
“point-in-time” estimate of default risk, as opposed
to the smoothed, “over-the-cycle” construct used by
the rating agencies.15
Interestingly, however, one does not see the same
comparative patterns when focusing on the entire
samples or on the non-investment-grade subsamples.
Indeed, for all non-investment-grade borrowers, the
mean KMV-based change in the capital charge under
method 2 is only 3 percent. While this may at first
seem counterintuitive, there is in fact a simple expla-
nation. The initial 1998 capital charge for this non-
investment-grade subsample in the KMV data is so
high—at 15.64 percent—that, if we exclude firms that
go into default, there is just not much room for the
remaining non-defaulted firms to see their capital charges
get much higher. Simply put, if one looks at a group
of firms that start out with very low credit ratings,
these ratings cannot get much lower outside of default,
and so there can never be more than a modest effect
on capital charges as a result of downgrades.
Conversely, highly rated firms have much further
to fall (again, outside of default), and so the banks that
lend to them are potentially more vulnerable to the sort
TABLE 2
Capital-charge cyclicality, 1998–2002, using KMV model
Percent change
Initial capital, capital
Method Region Rating class 1998 1998–2002
1 All All 10.72 35.91
1 All Investment-grade 4.01 111.47
1 All Non-investment-grade 15.64 21.61
1 Germany All 5.78 82.24
1 Germany Investment-grade 3.40 161.91
1 Germany Non-investment-grade 12.16 24.56
1 Rest of Europe All 7.26 62.53
1 Rest of Europe Investment-grade 3.66 139.07
1 Rest of Europe Non-investment-grade 13.12 27.90
1 North America All 12.17 44.45
1 North America Investment-grade 4.34 107.60
1 North America Non-investment-grade 16.56 35.14
1 Rest of world All 11.81 11.09
1 Rest of world Investment-grade 4.12 77.91
1 Rest of world Non-investment-grade 15.69 2.17
2 All All 10.72 13.81
2 All Investment-grade 4.01 82.54
2 All Non-investment-grade 15.64 3.20
2 Germany All 5.78 59.11
2 Germany Investment-grade 3.40 113.57
2 Germany Non-investment-grade 12.16 18.50
2 Rest of Europe All 7.26 31.27
2 Rest of Europe Investment-grade 3.66 92.62
2 Rest of Europe Non-investment-grade 13.12 5.64
2 North America All 12.17 9.86
2 North America Investment-grade 4.34 73.27
2 North America Non-investment-grade 16.56 4.23
2 Rest of world All 11.81 10.33
2 Rest of world Investment-grade 4.12 80.34
2 Rest of world Non-investment-grade 15.69 1.72
Notes: Investment-grade (IG) refers to all firms with a KMV EDFTM of 0.94 percent or better in December 1998; non-investment-grade (non-IG)
refers to the remainder. (This breakpoint is obtained by calculating the mean values of EDFTM for BBB-rated and BB-rated firms, and then
taking the midpoint.) There are 17,253 observations in the full sample (7,292 IG and 9,961 non-IG); 378 in the Germany subsample
(275 IG and 103 non-IG); 4,183 in the rest-of-Europe subsample (2,593 IG and 1,590 non-IG); 7,051 in the North America subsample
(2,532 IG and 4,519 non-IG); and 5,641 in the rest-of-world subsample (1,892 IG and 3,749 non-IG).27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of cyclicality in capital charges induced by the Basel
II framework. This observation brings us back to our
earlier point, about the importance of heterogeneity
across banks. Even if the Basel II capital requirements
do not create a large amount of cyclical variation for
all banks, they may well have large cyclical effects
on banks with particular kinds of portfolios, in this case,
banks that lend to relatively high-credit-quality firms.
Related literature
A handful of other recent papers have attempted
to perform simulations more or less like those in the
previous section. These include Carling, Jacobson, Linde,
and Roszbach (2002), Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and
Tsomocos (2003), Corcostegui, Gonzalez-Mosquera,
Marcelo, and Trucharte (2002), Heid (2003), Jordan,
Peek, and Rosengren (2003), Rosch, (2002), and
TABLE 3






Study Country Period basis otherwise) Notes
Ervin and Wilde U.S. 1990–92 Not specified 20 All BBB borrowers
(2001)
Segoviano and Lowe Mexico 3/95– Foundations, 69.8 Includes E-rated loans;
(2002) (Customers Nov. 2001 peak losses are in 12/96;
of main 12/99 Standardized 57.1 capital changes inferred
large banks) from their table 2.
Segoviano and Lowe Mexico 3/95– Foundations, 56.7 Excludes E-rated loans;
(2002) (Customers Nov. 2001 peak losses are in 12/96;
of main 12/99 Standardized 15.7 capital changes inferred
large banks) from their table 2.
Catarina-Rabell, U.S. high-quality 1990–92 QIS 3, 10/02 15.2 Based on Moody’s ratings
Jackson, and banks’ customers transitions of 5,022
Tsomocos (2003) U.S. average-quality 17.9 non-defaulting corporate
banks’ customers borrowers, using different
Same quality 15.3 Initial borrower distributions
customers as described in column 2.
Deutsche Bank
Catarina-Rabell, U.S. high-quality 1990–92 QIS 3, 10/02 53.2 Based on Merton model
Jackson, and banks’ customers PD transitions of 282
Tsomocos (2003) U.S. average-quality 8.8 borrowers, using different
banks’ customers initial borrower distributions
Same quality 47.1 described in column 2.
customers as
Deutsche Bank
Jordan, Peek, and U.S. 1996–2001 11/01 S&P: ≈20% Shared National Credit
Rosengren (2003) KMV: ≈280% borrowers, all loans exceed
$20 million.
Rosch (2002) U.S. 1982–2000 11/01 +15 Multiple one-year swings of
this size, based on S&P
transitions.
Corcostegui, Gonzalez- Spain 1993–2000 QIS 3, 10/02 –6.1 No base level given, + 3.1
Mosquera, Marcelo, percentage p.p. the year before this
and Trucharte (2002) points swing.
Carling, Jacobson, Sweden 1994–2000 1/01 –11.23 No base level of capital
Linde, and Roszbach percentage given, two methods of
(2002) points gauging PDs, either
historical default
–20.37 experience (top) or
percentage based on one model
points (bottom).28 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Segoviano and Lowe (2002). It is hard to directly
compare the numbers across all the studies, because
they vary along a number of dimensions. These in-
clude: 1) the sample period; 2) the universe of firms
under consideration; 3) the model used to derive
PDs; and 4) the fact that different papers use differ-
ent iterations of the Basel Committee formula that
maps the PD and other credit-risk parameters into a
capital charge. (Recall that this formula has been up-
dated more than once, most recently in October
2002.)
In table 3, we take a rough cut at summarizing the
key assumptions and results of several of these other
papers; in some cases we have had to read a bit between
the lines to do so. Here we will focus on a couple that
seem closest to what we have done: Catarineu-Rabell,
Jackson, and Tsomocos (2003), hereafter CJT, and
Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren (2003), hereafter JPR.
As we do, these papers perform simulations using both
credit ratings and a KMV-based approach.
With respect to the former methodology, CJT ex-
amine a sample of Moody’s-rated firms over 1990–1992,
and estimate an increase in Basel II capital charges of
between 15 percent and 18 percent for this period,
depending on the sample of firms considered. These
numbers are somewhat lower than the 30 percent–45
percent range that we obtained with the S&P data, using
our preferred method 2. Some of this difference may
well be due to the different sample period and to the
different universe of firms that they consider. But we
speculate that some of it is also likely to be due to CJT’s
not handling survivorship bias in the same way we do;
as best as we can tell, they only consider firms for which
data was available in every year from 1990 to 1992,
which raises the sorts of problems we discussed above.
One clue that survivorship bias may in fact help
to reconcile these results is that when we redo the
analysis using the freezing (rather than imputation)
approach to missing firms—which can be thought of
as only a partial fix for survivorship bias—we get an
estimate of 23 percent for the sample of all firms, quite
close to the CJT numbers. Going further, if we totally
disregard survivorship issues altogether, and simply
draw our sample from all firms that were present in
the S&P database throughout the period 1998–2002,
our estimate falls to 20 percent.
Essentially the same observations apply to JPR.
Using S&P credit-rating data from 1996 to 2001, they
estimate an increase in capital charges of about 20
percent. This is closely in line with the results of CJT,
and again, somewhat lower than the numbers we ob-
tain. As with CJT, we suspect that JPR do not take
account of survivorship bias in the same way we do
and that this helps to explain why their estimates of
cyclicality are smaller than ours.
With respect to the KMV-based analyses, the quali-
tative conclusions of CJT run closely parallel to ours.
In particular, they find that the KMV model can in-
duce a much greater degree of cyclicality in capital
charges (they get numbers on the order of 50 percent,
even without addressing survivorship-bias issues),
but that this tends to happen only when one looks at
a portfolio of high-credit-quality firms. For firms of
lower credit-quality, the cyclical effects generated by
KMV appear to be much more modest in their simu-
lations, as in ours.16
Conclusion
We take two broad messages away from the work
reported here. On the empirical front, our simulations
suggest that the new Basel II capital requirements have
the potential to create an amount of additional cycli-
cality in capital charges that is, at a minimum, economi-
cally significant, and that may be—depending on a
bank’s customer mix and the credit-risk models that
it uses—quite large. Our empirical analysis also un-
derscores the importance of dealing with various meth-
odological issues that crop up in this context, most
notably survivorship bias. As we have shown, failure
to do so can lead to estimates of cyclicality that are
substantially downward-biased.
On the theory side, our main point is that the Basel
II approach of having a single time-invariant risk curve
is, in principle, suboptimal. Instead, it is more desirable
to have a family of risk curves—that is, to tolerate a
greater probability of default when economy-wide bank
capital is scarce relative to lending opportunities.
One obvious objection to this conclusion is that
it is naïve with respect to political-economy consid-
erations. In particular, one might argue that any theory
that suggests reducing capital requirements in bad times
will simply give regulators an excuse to engage in af-
ter-the-fact forbearance, with all the accompanying po-
tential for various forms of regulatory moral hazard.
While we agree that such moral hazard concerns
are of great importance, we believe the above argument
can be turned on its head. If it really is the case that
capital requirements need to come down, say, in a se-
vere recession, it is probably better to acknowledge
this fact of life up front and to explicitly codify the
magnitude of the adjustment. Such ex ante codifica-
tion will, if anything, tend to reduce regulators’ ex post
discretion, thereby tempering moral hazard problems.
In contrast, with an unrealistically rigid ex ante rule
that never contemplates the need to reduce capital29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
requirements, the risk is that in a sufficiently bad sce-
nario, the rule will become de facto untenable. At this
point, it will be left to regulators to relax the rule as
they see fit—perhaps on a highly subjective case-by-
case basis—without any previously imposed constraints.
Of course, this discussion raises the question of
how one might design a credible, transparent formula
that links capital requirements to some measure of aggre-
gate economic conditions. This is a difficult question
and one that we are not prepared to answer fully. But
we venture a few thoughts. At one extreme, it is easy
to imagine crude rules that are based on aggregate
business cycle indicators. For example, one might drop
the required ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets
from 8 percent to 6 percent whenever GDP growth
falls below some threshold.17
While formulas of this sort seem like they would
be easy enough to implement, there may be a good
deal of slippage between something like GDP growth
and the construct that the theory tells us should be
relevant, namely the shadow value of bank capital.
Alternatively, one can try to come up with other, more
sophisticated indicators that track this shadow value
more closely.18 The tradeoff is that an overly compli-
cated, hard-to-verify measure is probably not much
better than no measure at all.
One way to get around these problems might be
to create a market for regulatory capital relief. In
particular, suppose that the regulator periodically
auctions off a small supply of tradable certificates, each
of which entitles the holder to breach the standard 8
percent capital requirement by, for example, $1 million
for one year. The market price of these certificates
would then be a direct and transparent measure of the
shadow value of bank capital—that is, a high price
would indicate a relative shortage of bank capital. More-
over, by allowing the regulator to increase the supply
of certificates in the face of rising prices, it would be-
come possible to tie the effective capital requirement to
this shadow value, just as the theory suggests should
be done.
We should stress that this last suggestion is intended
in the spirit of preliminary brainstorming, and nothing
more; we have not even begun to come to grips with
the many practical complexities that it would surely
entail. However, our aim here is not to push any one
particular proposal for linking capital requirements to
economic conditions. Rather, we just hope to call at-
tention to the general issue, and to illustrate that there
is a lot of room for further thought about it.30 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
1For an overview of the Basel II accord, see Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2003). Basel II is currently scheduled to
take effect in 2007.
2See Jackson (2002) for an explicit description of the Basel
Committee’s capital requirement formula and its evolution over
time.
3Several others have made similar suggestions. See, for example,
Gordy and Howells (2003), Rosch (2002), Ervin and Wilde
(2001), Purhonen (2002), and Cosandey and Wolf (2002).
4See, for example, Lowe (2002) for references. We discuss this
work in some detail below.
5In fact, many would argue that the lending opportunities dry up
in advance of a downturn and that the loans that go bad in the reces-
sion are the product of earlier bad decisions. In this case, tying the
capital increase to the recognition of the loan losses is inappropriate.
6Some well-known papers in this literature include Bernanke (1983),
Bernanke and Lown (1991), and Peek and Rosengren (1997).
7This is not to say that the motivation for these revisions was nec-
essarily to address the particular time-series problem that we
have identified here.
8A similar argument can be made with respect to loan-loss provi-
sions, which can be thought of as an attempt to set aside reserves
to deal with expected losses.
9All the simulations reported below were carried out with the as-
sistance of Michael Luxenburger of Deutsche Bank, whose work
we gratefully acknowledge.
10We set LGD = 0.45; M = 2.5 years; and EAD = 1, as is done in
the foundation approach. In all cases, we use the formula for
firms in the largest size class by revenues. Note that by keeping
LGD fixed over the business cycle, we may be ignoring a source
of variability in capital charges, since in reality, it is likely that
recovery rates on defaulted loans are lower in recessions. If this
is so, and if a given bank’s internal model takes this variation in
LGD into account, it will tend to have more cyclicality in (IRB
advanced) capital charges than our results suggest.
11One might argue that method 2 should remove defaulted firms
from the data immediately—rather than in the year after they de-
fault—if the goal is to get a sense of the purely incremental effect
created by the Basel II downgrading mechanism. The problem with
this approach (as applied to annual data) is that it leads us to ignore
any within-year downgrades that occur. For example, suppose a
firm is rated BB at year-end 1999, slips to CCC by mid-year 2000,
and then defaults right before the end of 2000. If we were to de-
lete this firm from the data after 1999, this would amount to ignor-
ing its final and most significant out-of-default downgrade.
12The mapping is as follows: AAA corresponds to a PD of 0.01
percent; AA to 0.03 percent; A to 0.07 percent; BBB to 0.23 per-
cent; BB to 1.07 percent; B to 4.82 percent; CCC to 22 percent;
and D to 100 percent. Because these PDs probably rise during
downturns, this mapping presumably leads us to understate the
degree of cyclicality in the capital charges.
13If the ratio of the method 2 to method 1 estimate is 40 percent,
this suggests that the extra cyclicality effect due to Basel II is 67
percent (40/60) of the preexisting effect due to Basel I alone.
14In the KMV data, we are not told explicitly when a firm is in
default. So we make the following approximation: We regard a
firm as defaulted if the KMV model yields an EDFTM (that is, an
estimated default probability) of 20 percent, and the firm disap-
pears from the data in the following year. We then apply our vari-
ous sample-selection protocols as before.
15A paper published by KMV (1998) shows that their ratings are
in fact considerably more volatile on a year-to-year basis than
those from S&P.
16Further confirming evidence on this point comes from Purhonen
(2002).
17Here we are also ignoring all the problems associated with the
timing of data releases and the revisions to macro data.
18For example, following Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), one
might look at the ratio of commercial paper issuance to bank loan
growth as a measure of tightness in bank loan supply, and hence
as a proxy for the relative scarcity of bank capital. But doing this
kind of indexation properly will likely require a number of ad-
justments to account for trends in the data, other sources of
shocks, and so on.
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